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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS &
ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS,

]
]1

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

]

vs.
CORY CURTIS &
ARWELLA CURTIS,
Defendants and Appellants.

i

Case No. 930340-CA

i

Priority 15

]

JURISDICTION OF COURT
This is an appeal by the Defendants/Appellants
(hereinafter Appellants) to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated from the Summary
Judgment rendered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Civil No. 910900664. The Utah Supreme Court referred
the matter to The Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(j), Utah Code Annotated.
References to pleadings in the record are given by the
pleading title.

No transcript numbers are given as no

transcript was ordered only record pages.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the Summary Judgment granted by the Honorable
Judge, James S. Sawaya in favor of the appellees and against
the appellants proper?
The standard of review for this Court from a grant of
Summary Judgment is that the appellate court will view the
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party and will
determine whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the
entry of judgment.

The appellate court will give no deference

to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are

reviewed

for correctness. Schurtz v BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1991).

But when it appears from the pleadings on file,

the affidavits in support and in opposition to the motion for
Summary Judgment and having heard counsel for both sides and
there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact, then
summary is not only proper, but required. Burninqham v. Ott,
525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974).
2. Are the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law

determined and entered by the trial court correct?
The standard of review of the appellate court relating to
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Addendum iv) is
fully set forth in Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
wherein it states:
"....Findings of Fact, whether based upon oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
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be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.11
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Grayson Roper LTD. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, (Utah 1989), page 470;
"...On the other hand, a trial court's findings
of fact are given deferential review.... To
successfully attack a trial court's findings of
fact, an appellant must first marshal all the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an
attack under Rule 52(a) standard, [citations
omitted]..."

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of case;
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment
entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya in the Third Judicial
District Court against Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis,
Appellants, and in favor of William Christopulos & Elvira
Christopulos, Appellees.
The action involved the breach and default of a trust
deed note by the appellants.

The trust deed note was entered

into by the appellants on February 1, 1987 with a Mr. Darrell
B. Hicks. (Addendum i)

This trust deed note was assigned to

the Appellees on February 20, 1987. (Addendum ii)

This trust

deed note was subordinate to other notes covering a piece of
real property and a prior lien holder foreclosed on the real
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property. The Appellees commenced this suit on the trust deed
note to recover sums that were past due and owing.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition:
1. Appellees commenced suit against the appellants on
January 30, 1991. (R.2)
2. Appellants were served the summons and complaint on
February 14, 1991 and the return of service was filed with the
court. (Ft.8)
3. Appellant's counsel filed an answer and counterclaim
to Appellees complaint on March 6, 1991. (R.9).

No jury was

requested.
4. Appellee's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim on March 13, 1991. (R.16)
5. Appellant's counsel filed a reply to appellees motion
to dismiss (R.20) and the matter was submitted to the court
for decision. (R.23)
6. On April 9, 1991 the Court denied appellees motion to
dismiss. (R.25)
7. On April 17, 1991 appellees served upon the appellants
their first set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents (R.25A) and replied
to appellants counterclaim. (R.26)
8. On May 17, 1991 counsel for appellants withdrew as
counsel. (R.28)
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9. On May 21, 1991 appellees filed a Request to Appear in
Person or Appoint New Counsel and then on May 30, 1991 (R.31)
appellants filed an appearance pro se. (R.32)
10. In a document dated May 15, 1991, appellants
attempted to answer appellees discovery requests.(Addendum
iii) .
11. On January 10, 1992 appellees filed

a Motion for

Summary Judgment against the appellants together with
affidavits. (R.35)
12. On January 29, 1992 appellees' counsel filed a Notice
to Submit it's Motion for Summary Judgment to the court.
(R.51)
13. On February 4, 1992 appellants filed a document,
dated January 20, 1992, in opposition to appellees' Motion for
Summary Judgment entitled "Final Response and Motion to
dismiss plaintiff's claim and award defendants appropriate
damages as heretofore mentioned in the defendants
counterclaim." (R.52)

Appellants never filed any documents

under oath or affidavits in response to appellees' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
14. On February 10, 1992 appellees filed their response
to the document filed by the appellants on February 4, 1992.
(R.62)
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15. On February 13, 1992 the court denied appellees
Motion for Summary Judgment stating no reasons for the denial.
(R.64)
16. On June 16, 1992 appellees requested a trial setting
(R.65) and a non jury trial was set in this matter on
September 22, 1992 with a pre trial conference set for
September 14, 1992 in the Third District Court before the
Honorable* Judge James S. Sawaya. (R.66, R.68)
17. On September 14, 1992 the Appellees with their
counsel and the appellant, Cory Curtis, appeared at the pre
trial conference. Appellant, Arwella Curtis did not appear. At
the pretrial conference matters were discussed and settlement
was encouraged.

Also, at the pretrial conference the court on

it's own motion continued the trial date as there was a
conflict with another matter. No new trial date was set.
18. On September 16, 1992 appellees filed a Motion with
the court to Reconsider Their Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R.69)
19. On September 21, 1992 appellants filed a letter with
the court. (R.71)
20. On September 30, 1992 appellants filed a response to
appellees' Motion to Reconsider Their Motion for Summary
Judgment entitled "Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for a
Reconsideration for a Summary Judgment and Request for Jury
Trial." (R.77)
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21. On September 30/ 1992 appellees asked the court to
submit for decision their Motion to Reconsider and Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R.72)
22. On October 22, 1992 the court granted appellees'
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.82)
23. On October 26, 1992 the appellees counsel, prepared,
filed and mailed to the appellants their proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R.83, Addendum iv,
v) Judgment was signed on October 27, 1992. (Addendum v)
24. On November 6, 1992 an attorney for the appellants
(the same attorney that withdrew earlier) filed a Motion to
Amend Judgment. (R.90). No objections to the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment was filed by the appellants
or their counsel.
25. On November 12, 1992 appellees filed their response
to the appellants1 Motion to Amend Judgment. (R.102)
26. On November 23, 1992 appellees counsel filed a notice
to Submit for Decision appellants' Motion to Amend Judgment.
(R.112)
27. On November 23, 1992 the court denied appellants'
Motion to Amend judgment. (R.114)

Appellees counsel prepared

the Order and the Order was signed on December 7, 1992.
(R.115)
28. Notice of Appeal was filed by the appellants on
December 18, 1992. (R.127) Defendants again filed a second
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notice to appear pro se on December 18, 1992. (R.126).

There

has been no withdrawal of counsel by defendants counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellees and appellants have admitted to the
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter by the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County and have further admitted
that venue is proper (Finding of Fact, paragraph 1 R.84;)
1. Appellants entered into a written trust deed and trust
deed note (hereinafter the trust deed note will be referred to
a the "promissory note") with a Mr. Darrell B. Hicks on or
about February 1, 1987. A true and exact copy of the
promissory note

is attached hereto as

part of the addendum

and incorporated herein by this reference. (Defendants answer
to plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 2, (R.9); Findings of
Fact, paragraph 2 (R.84)).
2. On or about March 6, 1987 the trust deed and trust
deed note (promissory note) was assigned to appellees. A true
and exact copy of which is in the addendum and incorporated
herein by his reference. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 3,
(R.84))
3.

Under the

terms of the promissory note, exhibit A,

appellants were to pay to the appellees the sum of $13,500.00
which was to also collect interest on the unpaid sums at the
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rate of 5.7% per annum. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 4,
(R.84)).
4.

Under the terms of the promissory note, appellants

were to make payments of "principal and interest payable as
follows:
Semi-annual interest payments representing 5.7% per
annum of the unpaid balance were to commence on August 1, 1987
and continue through the term of the contract.

Lump sum

principal payments of $4,000.00 were due on February 1, 1992;
and $4,000.00 due on February 1, 1997; and $5,500.00 plus any
accrued interest, representing the last semi-annual interest
payment, as a final payment was to be due on February 1, 2002.
(Findings of Fact paragraph 5, (R.84)).
5. The three lump sum payments total only $13,500.00.
6. The promissory note allows for "semi annual payments"
on the "principal and interest" commencing August 1, 1987.
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 5, (R.84)).
7. The interest accumulated on $13,500.00 at the rate of
5.7% per annum is $64,125 per month or $384.75 semi-annually.
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6, (R.85)).
8. Appellants made four payments, semi-annually of
$384.75.

(See docketing statement of appellants, page 3;

Finding of Fact, paragraph 7, (R. 85)).
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9. No other payments have been made on the principal or
interest on the promissory note and appellants are in default.
(Findings of Fact# paragraph 8, (R.85)).
10. The amount owing under the terms of the promissory
note is $16,767.66 as of October 27, 1992. (Findings of Fact,
paragraph 9, (R.85)).
11. Appellees retained an attorney to help them collect
under the terms of the promissory note and the amount claimed
to be owing to the attorney as of October 27, 1992, in the
amount of $1,601.00, is reasonable. (Findings of Fact,
paragraph 10, (R.85)).
12. Appellees have made no misrepresentations to the
appellants. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 11, (R.85)).
13. Appellees filed suit against the appellants in
January, 1991, due to default in payment under the promissory
note and the appellees acted properly in commencing the
lawsuit at that time. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 12,
(R.85)).
14. Appellants' attorney filed an answer and counterclaim
to this lawsuit in March, 1991. Appellants did not request a
jury trial. The district judge was the trier of fact.
15.

Appellees filed discovery requests of the appellants

and after the discovery was due the attorneys for the
appellants withdrew as counsel for the appellants. (R.28).

14

16. Appellees requested a trial in this matter. A
pretrial conference was set for September 14, 1992 and non
jury trial was set for September 22, 1992. The appellant, Cory
Curtis appeared at the pre-trial conference, appellant,
Arwella Curtis, did not. Appellees appeared and were
represented by counsel.

The matter was discussed and

settlement was encouraged.

The court on it's own motion, due

to a conflict with another matter, struck the trial date in
this matter.
17. In September, 1992, after the pretrial conference and
the trial being continued, appellees asked the court to
reconsider their Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Summary

Judgment was granted. (Addendum v)
18.

Appellees filed the Judgment together with Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law with the court which were
accepted and signed by the Court on October 27, 1992.
Appellants did not objected to the Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law. (A true and exact copy of said Findings of
Fact and Conclusion of Law and said judgment is part of the
addendum iv, v). Appellants counsel did file a Motion to Amend
Judgment which was denied. (R.90).
19.

Appellants did attempt to make payment after the

lawsuit was filed to the appellees for the sum of $2,076.25
which check was not negotiated and returned to the appellants
immediately. Appellants were informed that this was not a

15

proper payment under the terms of the promissory note and the
payment was being returned.
16.

Attached in the addendum are the pro se responses by

the Appellees to appellants Requests for Admissions,
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
(Addendum iii)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court in granting the summary judgment after allowing
the appellants over twenty two months to prove there claims
was proper.
considered

There are no material questions of fact to be
to prevent the granting the Summary Judgment as

the contract is clear on it's face.

Even if the contract is

questioned as to clarity, then the only competent extrinsic
evidence properly before the court would still allow the
Summary Judgment. The Judge in this matter is the trier of
fact as no jury was requested.
There was no judgment rendered at the pretrial conference
and the effort to introduce new evidence at the appellate
court level is improper.
There was not objection to the Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law and therefore should not be disturbed.
This is just and effort by the appellants to delay this
matter and prevent the appellees from collecting their money.
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Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees in defending
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The Judgment is Proper
A. The Summary Judgment is proper.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file (emphasis added) together with
the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The purpose of Summary Judgment is to look beyond the mere
allegations in the pleadings to see if there exists any
genuine issue as to any material fact. If there appears to be
none, then the trial court should then award judgment to the
moving party when adequate proof is submitted in support of
the motion. Pleadings alone are not sufficient to raise an
issue of fact. Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 10 Utah2d 250
(1960).
The opposing party should at a minimum produce some
evidence to contradict the movant's case and raise a question
of fact.

Summary Judgment is not a harsh rule.

When it

appears from the pleadings on file, the affidavits in support
of and in opposition to (if any) the motion for Summary
Judgment, and any arguments of counsel for parties, that there
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appears to be no genuine issue of fact, summary judgment is
the only proper procedure the courts should use. Burninqham v.
Ott, 525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974).

Defendants have had ample

time, over twenty-two months, to present their evidence in
support of their alleged defenses and claims and they have
failed to do so.
The appellants, both by their pro se pleadings and by the
pleadings filed by their counsel state that n[t]he essential
facts of this case are undisputed'1

and that

fi

[t]he only issue

in this case is regarding the effect, if any, of the words,
'Semi-annual payments commencing August 1 and February 1 semiannually" . Appellants stated in their pleadings that the only
issue is a legal question.

This is in conflict with the

claims made in appellants brief. They say there are remaining
questions of fact.

Never has appellants set forth what these

"questions of fact" are or how they may be material. In
appellants pleading entitled "Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Motion
for a Reconsideration for a Summary Judgment and Request for
Jury Trial" they state that "the legal dispute [emphasis
added] has always been based on WHEN interest is to be paid,
not if interest is due on the note." (R.77)

Appellants do not

dispute the amounts in the promissory note, that the note was
signed by them, that the note as assigned to the appellees,
that interest is owing on the note and that here has been no
payments on this note since 1989
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and the note requires

payments semi-annually.

In fact, appellants admit that they

made payments of exactly an amount that would be owing as
interest on the note ($384.75) for at least two years semiannually before they ceased making payments on the note and
thus became in default. Appellants have never objected to or
disputed these facts and in fact admitted them in their
pleading and brief.
Appellants have had ample time to support their
allegations, present evidence, respond to evidence, examine
witnesses and do discovery contrary to the statements in their
brief.

They have repeatedly failed, either by their counsel

or by themselves, to

present any facts, documents or

affidavits to controvert the evidence of the appellees or to
change the conclusions of the trial court.
Appellants have a burden to present some evidence in the
trial court to establish their allegations and defenses.
is their burden of proof.

This

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Koeslinq v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975) that:
"The proponent of a proposition has two
burdens relative to his proof: to produce
evidence which proves or tends to prove the
proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier
of fact that his evidence is more credible or
entitled to the greater weight, (footnote
omitted)"
Appellants failed to produce any competent evidence at the
trial court level and was thus unable to persuade the trier of
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fact, here the judge, that their evidence was more credible
than the evidence produced by the appellees. The trial court
is under an obligation to only look at the evidence which is
properly before it.
The standard of review in this matter regarding Summary
Judgment is clear.

In reviewing a Summary Judgment the

appellate court must look at the fact in the light favorable
to the losing party, here the appellants, and determine if the
facts are still sufficient to support a motion for Summary
Judgment.

(Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.

813 P.2d 104 (Utah

1991)). If it appears from the pleadings on file, the
affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the motion
for Summary Judgment and having heard the statements of
counsel, or the parties, from both sides and there appears to
be no genuine issues as to material fact, then Summary
Judgment is not only proper, but required. Burninqham v. Ott,
525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974). The facts are clearly sufficient to
support the Summary Judgment. In viewing the facts before the
court in this matter, there is only one legal conclusion,
which is the one arrived at by the trial court in it's rulings
and judgment. The Findings of Fact by the trial court found
that appellants promised to make payment of money to the
appellees, including interest being paid semi-annually.
Appellants failed to make said payments when due and are
therefore in default of the promissory note. Inasmuch as a
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challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions
of law only, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for
correctness based upon the undisputed facts.
A decision by a trial court is completely discretionary
on the part of the trial judge and it is not improper just
because "reasonable men could draw different conclusions from
conflicting evidence. (Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co. 27
Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972)). There has been no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering this
judgment.

B. Contract Interpretation:
The appellants claim that the contract has not been
interpreted correctly.

In interpreting a contact, a court

shall determine what the parties intended by examining the
entire contract and all of its parts in connection with each
other.

The court will give an objective and reasonable

construction to the contract as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma,
655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah 1982); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis
Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). In interpreting a
contract, the court should act so as to harmonize all of its
terms and provisions, and all of its terms and provisions be
given effect if possible. The contract ( here the promissory
note) is clear.

It states that appellants will pay the sum of

"Thirteen Thousand, Five hundred and no/100 Dollars

21

($13,500.00) together with interest from date (emphasis added)
at the rate of Five & 07/100 per cent (5.7%) per annum on the
unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as
follows; (emphasis added)
Semi-annual payments commencing August 1, and February 1,
semi-annually."
It is clear that appellants were to make a payment every
six months.

The interest on $13,500.00 at 5.7% for six months

is $384.75.

Appellants did pay at four (4) payments of

$384.75 at six month intervals on or near August 1 and
February 1.

Clearly they chose to

keep current on the

interest only, with no payments being made to the principal.
At this rate, appellants were to make the full lump sum
payments according to the terms of the note at the times they
were due. Appellants argument asks the question of how were
the appellants going to calculate the interest on the sums
prior to each lump sum payment?

It appears that no interest

was owing. Appellants did attempt to make a payment in April,
1992 of a sum less than $4,000.00 and it did not include any
payments toward interest, (see appellants brief, addendum).
What was the interest going to be at the end of the note based
upon the calculations of the appellants in making this first
payment?.

It appears that it would be some great sum or none

at all. This is clearly contrary to the terms of the
promissory note.

It would be wise to note here that
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appellants failed to make any payments "semi-annually11 under
the terms of the note after 1989 which is why it was declared
in default and suit was commenced.
Contracts must receive a reasonable construction
according to the intentions of the parties and the terms of
the agreements.

An interpretation which will bring about an

equitable result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable
one.

An interpretation of the contract should be adopted

which under all the circumstances of the case, ascribes the
most reasonable, equitable, probable reading of the contract.
The court must accord commonly accepted meanings to the words
or phrases to a contract wherever possible. Gordon v. CRS
Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991).
The interpretation offered by the appellants is not
reasonable, probable or equitable.

They claim that interest,

if any, would only be due at the end of the note.

They can

pay what they wish, when they wish and deduct the sum from the
principal due and owing without incurring interest.

This

would be an improbable and an inequitable result.

C. Is the Contract Ambiguous?
Appellants also claim that the promissory note is
ambiguous. Appellees deny that the trust deed note is
ambiguous.

"The language of a contract is not necessarily

ambiguous merely because a party urges a different meaning
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that is more in accordance with its own interests." Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App.1991),
cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). Appellants hope the
contract is ambiguous in order to justify the default and
limit their liability. This should not succeed.
If a contract is ambiguous, parole evidence or extrinsic
is admissible to explain the parties intent. When ambiguity
exists, the interest of the parties

is a question of fact to

be determined by the finder of fact. Plateau Min. v. Utah Div.
of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). In this matter
the finder of fact was the trial court judge as no jury was
requested.

The trial court judge had the opportunity to

review the documents, talk to the appellant Cory Curtis, and
hear the arguments of both sides before making any ruling.
The

parol and extrinsic evidence before the court

was

provided by the appellees, under oath, and admitted as fact by
the appellants. (R.10, R.52, Brief Pg. 8)) Appellants
presented NO evidence to contradict to the statements and
affidavits of the appellants in spite of having over twentytwo months to provide contrary evidence. The actions by the
appellants of making the $384.75 payments semi-annually on the
promissory note exactly in

accordance with appellees

interpretation of the terms of the promissory note and in an
amount exactly equal to interest on $13,500.00 at 5.7% per
annum would indicate that the appellants understood that the
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payments were for interest and were due semi-annually. This is
admitted in appellents brief (Brief pg. 8). Why else were the
payments made?

Appellants never explained the reasons for the

payments being made.

D. Judgment at pretrial conference:
Appellants also claim that a judgment was rendered at the
pretrial conference.

The facts do not support this claim.

Settlement was encouraged by Judge Sawaya, in a manner similar
to all other judges at their pretrial conference in my
experience.

The judgment was rendered on appellees Motion for

Summary Judgment days after the pretrial conference.

The

appellants claim that the action by Judge Sawaya prejudiced
them in obtaining a settlement, to their satisfaction, of the
matter. Why was it prejudicial?

Could it be that appellants

knew they were in default and they hoped to "rewrite" the
terms of the contract to better suit their circumstances?

The

appellants know that they owe the money and are just
attempting to change the terms of the contract.

E: Did the court rewrite the contract?
Appellants further rely upon Dalton v. Jerico
Construction Company, 642 P.2d 748, (Utah 1982)

for the

proposition that " a court cannot improvidently rewrite a
contract entered into at arms length between parties."
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This

is true.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in Dalton, infra, at

750, "...the contract between the parties control."

The

contract controls in this matter and the contract is clear on
its face the intent of the parties with regards to the payment
of principal and interest.
rewritten.

This contract is not being

It is the court's responsibility to make a ruling

based upon the facts before it and this is why the Summary
Judgment was granted.

F. Presentation of new evidence.
Appellants claim they have discovered new evidence that
may change the outcome of this matter. First, New evidence
cannot be presented at this time, it would be improper.
Second, appellants did not say when the new evidence was
discovered and no motion was made in the trial court to
reconsider the matter based upon the alleged new evidence.
Third, the alleged new evidence is not relevant to this issues
between these parties and would not change the judgment or
appellants liability in this matter.

Point II
The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law are Proper
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accepted and
signed by the trial court are not erroneous and should not be
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disturbed pursuant to the standard found in Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and supporting case law, supra.

Point III
Appellees ask the court for their costs and attorneys
fees in this matter under Rule 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

This appeal is meant for delay and is a

frivolous appeal.
CONCLUSION
Appellees ask the court to dismiss this appeal, affirm
the lower courts judgment and award Appellees their costs and
attorneys fees.

To do otherwise would do an injustice to the

Appellees. They have not received any payments on a admitted
to promissory note for over four years.
Dated this 6th day of July, 1993.

Jones
fey for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copy of
the forgoing Appellants Brief, postage prepaid by U.S. ,Mail
this $*£

day of July, 1993 to Appellants at:

Cory Curtis & Arwella Curtis
312 West 2000 North #D
Salt Lake City, Utah 84041

Jones
torrffey for p l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l e e s
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THIS TRUST DEED is msde this
day of
February
CORY CURTIS And ATOCLLA CURTIS, hie wife
whose Address is

42S4 South A l b e r t Dcivs, S a l t LaJca City,
(8tf««t sad Numb**)
(CHy)

,19 «7
, M Trustor,
Utah
(8uu)
, AS T r u s t s / And

UTAH TITLE AND ABSTACT COMPAHY

, AS BeneficiAry.

DARRELL fi. HINCXS

Trustor hereby CONVEY8 AND WARRANTS' TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER
Salt Leke
OF SALE, the foUowinf described property situated in
County, UtAh:
All of Lot 3 , VZCAS SUBDIVISION, According to tty# o f f l c U l p l i c thereof,
recorded In the o f f i c e of the County Recorder of S s l t LekA County, UtAh.
THE BENEFICIARY ACREES TO SUBORDINATED THIS TRUST DEED (ONE TIKE ONLY, EITHER
TOR A SECOND Ct IP PROPERTY IS REFINANCED) TO A RELIABLE LENDER IN THE AREA.,
PER ACREEXENT OF BOTH PARTIES.

Toftthor fHth all buddings, fixtures and Improvements thoroon §nd all water rights, rights of wty,
easements, tents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and sppurtenanoes
tbortuato now or herecfter used or enjoyed with Mid property, or any pert thereof;
FOR THE PURP08E OP 8ECURINO payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of fl3f 300.00
f payable to the order of
Beneficiary at the times, la the Banner and with interest M therein Mi forth, and payment of any
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof.
Trustor a p e * to pay all taxes and aseesementa on the above property, to pay all charges and
aseesements on water or witer stock used on or with said property, not to consult ws/tte, to mstntsin
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and airsnsos of collection (indudinf Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the mdebtednees secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee
hereunder, indudinf a reconveyance hereof.
_
The undersifned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice sf defcfltt^fficTot any notice of SAIC
hereunder be mailed to him at the address heremo '

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the / f

daycf

February

• It • *

9

personally appeared before me

CORY CURTIS and AXWZLU CURTIS, h i s wife

,^Hfar*i4T»r~
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Arwella P. Curtis
168 West Center St.
North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054
Defendants(s) Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis response to Plaintiff(s)
William Christopulos and Elvira Christopulos regarding requests for
admissions, interrogatories and requests for production of documentsCivil No. 910900664 CN- Judge James S. Sawaya
Due to finincial hardship, W e , Cory and Arwella Curtis the
defendant(s) will personally respond to said requests for admissions,
interrogatories and requests for production of documents from the
plaint iff(s) • At the time of trial we intend to once again aquire the
services of the Law offices of Kirton, McConkie and Poleman.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS- RESPONSE
Request No* 1: Allegations denied. Interest payments have not been on
the trust deed note* Semi annual partial payments of $384*75 have
been made towards the first principle payment of $4,000*00. which is
due on 2/1/92.
Request No. 2: Allegations denied. We are not aware of any specific
semi-annual interest payment amount that was agreed upon at the time
the agreement was made. No specific semi-annual interest payments are
set forth in the trust deed note.
Request No. 3: Allegations denied. Partial payments of $384.75
towards the first principle payment of $4,000.00 were made on or
about the four dates listed.
Request No. 4: Allegations denied. Other partial payments towards the
first principle payment were made to the plaint iff(s). Documentation
of such will be forthcoming in 30-90 days.

INTERROGATORIES-RESPONSE
1. CQry and Arwella Curtis, the defendants
2. Already incorporated in response to said requests.
3a- The .question is unclear. What is the difference between
"purchasing" and "receiving" said property? Admission is made that
defendants purchased said property.
3b- Enclosed please find the following documents;
a) Trust Deed Note
b) Assignment of Trust Deed
c) Trust Deed
d) A s s i g n m e n t o f M o r t g a g e p a p e r w o r k f o r t h c o m i n g i n
4.

In

August

of

1987 I r e c e i v e d

the

enclosed

letter

£*£
30-90
from

days.
William

and

when the original purchase agreement was made, and dispite the fact
that no specific semi-annual payment amounts were agreed upon or
listed in the legal agreements, they stated in the letter that
semi-annual payments were to be made in the amount of $38U.75» This
was the first time, six months after the trust deed note was signed,
that the amount of $38U.75 was ever mentioned to us as a semi-annual
payment amount by anyone. Please note that the letter does not refer
to the payment as an "interest" payment. Although the payment
schedule that the Plaintiff sent us was not accurate or
representative of the agreement that we had made, we wanted to make
semi-annual payments towards the principle payment of $U,000.00 that
would be due 2/1/92.
5. We the defendants do not remember having any written or oral
communication directly with the plaintiff(s) at the time of the
transaction. Likewise we do not remember having any written or oral
communication directly with Mr. Darrel Hicks at or during the time o
the transaction. All communication was with Mr. Hicks agent, Mr. Eri
Glenn. Except for the documents provided, all communication with Mr.
Glenn was oral. Since the transaction took place over four years ago
it is difficult to remember in detail all communications refering to
said transaction. We are not aware of any default of the trust deed
note relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit.
a,b,c) We are currently making an attempt to document discussions
that took place with Mr. Glenn. Due to our current employment-travel
obligations we require additional time in responding to this reply30-90 days.
6,7>8>9910 ,11 & 12. These interogatories are premature and therefore
inappropriate at this time. We the defendant are under no obligation
to defend our position regarding the fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, negligence, etc. that took place at the time of
the transaction until the trust deed note has gone into default.
13» W e , the defendant(s) are currently working with our bank and
other bookkeeping entities to collect and verify said documentation
of payments that have been made pertaining to said lawsuit. We
require 30-90 days to provide you with this information.
Sincerely,
Dated ^fclf^s 15th day of May 1991

Kyle w. Jones 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7771
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS &
ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS,
Plaintiffs,

]|
]
)

;|

vs.

JUDGMENT

CORY CURTIS &

]

ARWELLA CURTIS,

]i

Civil No. 910900664CN
Judge: James Sawaya

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on properly before the
above entitled court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

The Court having read the pleadings on file

in this matter and having heard the statements of defendant
Cory Curtis at pretrial on September 22, 1992 and being fully
advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

2.

That defendants counterclaim be dismissed with

prejudice.
V

3.

That Plaintiff have judgment against the defendants,

Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis as follows:
$16,767.66

principal and interest to date;

$ 1,601,00

Attorneys fees to date; and

$

accrued costs to date; and

91.50

$18,460.16

TOTAL JUDGMENT,

with interest thereon at the judgment rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum until paid, plus after accruing costs and
attorneys fees.
DATED: ft (JV 7 |

f

^^
BY THE COURT:

m
Honorable James Sawaya
District Judge

Kyle W. Jones
1744
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7771
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS &
ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CORY CURTIS &
ARWELLA CURTIS,
Defendants.

)
1
])

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;i

Civil No. 910900664CN

]t

Judge: James Sawaya

This matter came on properly before the above entitled
court pursuant Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration for
a decision on plaintiffs' Motion to reconsider plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The court has reviewed the pleadings in this matter

and has talked to the defendant Cory Curtis and counsel for
the plaintiff at the pretrial on September 22, 1992.

The

Court being fully informed granted plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment by minute entry on

IV

October 22, 1992.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs and defendants are both residents of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah and have admitted to jurisdiction
of this Court over the person and the subject matter and has
admitted venue is proper.
2.

Defendants, Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis entered

into a written Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note on February 1,
1987 with a Mr. Darrell B. Hicks which is a valid and proper
contract.
3.

On March 6, 1987 the Trust Deed

and Trust Deed Note

mentioned infra was assigned to the plaintiffs.
4.

The terms of the Trust Deed Note required defendants

to pay to the holder of the note, here the plaintiffs, the sum
of $13,500.00 plus interest over time.
5.

The defendants were to make payments of principal and

interest under the terms of the Trust Deed Note as follows:
Semi-annual interest payments representing 5.7% per
annum of the unpaid balance were to commence on August 1, 1987
and continue through the term of the contract. Lump sum
principal payments of $4,000.00 were due on February 1, 1992;
$4,000.00 was to be due on February 1, 1997; and $5,500.00
plus any accrued interest, representing the last semi-annual
interest payment, as a final payment was to be due on February
1, 2002.

6.

The interest accumulated on $13,500.00 at the rate of

5-7% per annum is $64,125 per month or $384.75 semi annually.
7.

Defendants made four (4) interest payments, semi-

annually of $384.75.

The payments were received on August 1,

1987; February 1, 1988; August 1, 1989 and February 1, 1989.
8.

No payments have been made on the principal of the

Trust Deed Note and Defendants are in default under the terms
of the subject Trust Deed Note.
9.

The amount due and owing under the terms of the Trust

Deed Note due to the default of the defendants is $16,767.66
and said amount is reasonable.
10. Plaintiffs' retained an attorney to help them collect
under the terms of the trust deed note and the amount claimed
to be owing to the attorney in the amount of $1,601.00 is
reasonable.
11. Plaintiffs have made no misrepresentations to the
defendants.
12. Defendants were acting properly in commencing this
action at the time the lawsuit was commenced.
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter and venue is proper.
2. The defendants are both liable for the sums due and
owing under the subject Trust Deed Note to the plaintiffs.

3.

The Trust Deed Note is an enforceable contract

between the defendants and the plaintiffs and the defendants
have not established any facts to any alleged defenses.
4.

The defendants have not established their right to

any recovery under their counterclaim and the counterclaim
should be dismissed. The claim by the plaintiffs was
meritorious as presented and alleged by the plaintiffs and
their counsel.
5.

Defendants are responsible to pay plaintiffs

reasonable attorneys fees in this matter pursuant to the terms
of the Trust Deed Note.
6.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs in

this matter and interest in this matter.
7.

The Court shall entered judgment accordingly.

DATED:
BY THE COURT:

i£i
Honorable James Sawaya
District Court Judge

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a j u r y or with a n
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and s t a t e separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and j u d g m e n t shall be entered p u r s u a n t to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions t h e court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute t h e
grounds of its action. Requests for findings a r e not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to j u d g e t h e credibility of t h e witnesses.
The findings of a master, to t h e extent t h a t t h e court adopts them, shall be
considered as. the findings of t h e court. It will be sufficient if t h e findings of
fact and conclusions of law a r e stated orally a n d recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in a n opinion or m e m o r a n d u m of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not e n t e r findings of fact a n d
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except a s provided in Rule 4Kb). T h e
court shall, however, issue a brief written s t a t e m e n t of t h e ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) a n d (b), 56, a n d 59
when t h e motion is based on more t h a n one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t - Upon motion of a party made not later t h a n 10 days after
e n t r y of j u d g m e n t the court may amend its findings or m a k e additional findings and may amend t h e j u d g m e n t accordingly. The motion m a y be m a d e with
a motion for a new trial p u r s u a n t to Rule 59. When findings of fact a r e m a d e
in actions tried by the court without a jury, t h e question of t h e sufficiency of
t h e evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised w h e t h e r or not
t h e party raising the question has made in t h e district court a n objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend t h e m , a motion for j u d g ment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) W a i v e r of f i n d i n g s of fact a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w . Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law m a y be waived by t h e
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear a t t h e trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in t h e cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in t h e m i n u t e s .
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. - - This rule is similar to
Rule 52, FJLC.P.
Cross-References.
Masters. Rule 53.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—ContempC
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.

—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial reviiew.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.
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that issue Do*ne\ State Bank \ MajorBlakene> Corp 545 P 2d 507 (Utah 1976)
—Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a
summons, and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original, the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should have been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits Locke v. Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65.
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,

scheduled aopearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no lam or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P_2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realtv & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P-2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A!d)).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979r. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 fUtab
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. J u r . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213
C.J.S. — 49 C JJS. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 AJLR.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 AXJL3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment rbtWn^
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A LR3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for de^
fault judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear af]
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United Stafceal
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Qigj]
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) F o r c l a i m a n t A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) F o r defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, m;
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,.
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in Ids
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion a n d proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to thi§
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories;
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the

VII

^racticanie ascerrain wnat material iacts exist witnout substantial contro*,orsv and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It
-hall thereupon m a k e an order specifying the facts t h a t appear w i t h o u t substantial controversy, including the extent to which t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in t h e
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; d e f e n s e r e q u i r e d . Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively t h a t the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories.
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, s u m m a r y j u d g ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are u n a v a i l a b l e . Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for j u d g m e n t or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is j u s t .
(g) Affidavits m a d e i n b a d faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally.
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.
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